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ABSTRACT
We investigate the effect of risk management (reinsurance) on the corporate cost of
equity using panel data drawn from the United Kingdom’s (UK) non-life insurance
industry. Our results show that use of reinsurance lowers the cost of equity but that
the relation is non-linear. We find that the rate of reduction declines as the level
of premiums ceded relative to total gross premiums written increases. We also find
that the reinsurance-cost of equity relation is moderated by the risk of financial dis-
tress/bankruptcy. This moderating relation is robust to the use of three alternative
measures of financial distress and bankruptcy risk.
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This paper examines whether the use of reinsurance – a common and widely reported risk management tech-
nique in the insurance industry – has an effect on cost of equity (discount rate) of non-life (property-casualty)
insurers operating in the United Kingdom (UK). Examining the factors that influence the corporate cost of
equity is a salient issue as it reflects investors’ trade-off between risk and return over investment decisions and
it is a crucial component of discount rate in companies’ capital budgeting decisions (Easley and O’Hara, 2004).
The cost of equity is also an important variable as it is used in corporate valuation, the setting of managerial
performance targets, and the regulation of rates of return (O’Hanlon and Steele, 2000). Indeed, prior empiri-
cal studies have demonstrated a direct empirical linkage between risk management and the cost of equity. For
instance, Gay, Lin and Smith (2011) find the cost of equity for the users of derivatives is lower than that of non-
users. Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011) also find a negative relation between the use of financial derivatives
and, both, total and systematic risks. In the same vein, Disatnik, Duchin and Schmidt (2013) show that corpo-
rate hedging makes access to external funding more cost-effective. There is, however, a lack of evidence on the
effect of risk management on the cost of equity of financial intermediaries, such as banks and insurers, which
are usually excluded from cross-industry studies due to their unique (e.g., highly levered) financial structure,
opaque systems of accounting, and active risk-trading/risk-bearing activities (e.g., see Larsen andResutek, 2017).
The present study therefore contributes to the finance literature by providing empirical evidence on the cost of
equity-risk management nexus within the insurance industry, and also identifies a channel through which this
relation manifests itself in capital markets.
One strand of the finance literature suggests that the risk management function affects the cost of equity
through its impact on financial distress and default risk, but the empirical evidence is mixed. On the one hand,
Dichev (1998) and Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagi (2008) report that default risk and realized stock returns are
negatively related, which suggests that the cost of equity capital decreases with a rise in default risk. On the other
hand, Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010) show that default risk is systematic, and
so equity investors will tend to demand above market average returns for bearing this risk. Therefore, in theory,
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risk management can reduce the cost of equity by reducing the default risk. This study analyses the cost of
equity, probability of default and reinsurance nexus in order to establish the channel through which reinsurance
affects the cost of equity. We calculate firm-level equity risk premia using a novel method, which combines the
full information beta method of Kaplan and Peterson (1998) with the non-parametric method of equity beta
estimation of Wen et al., (2008).
To explore the risk premium–riskmanagement relation, we adopt a panel datamodelling approach to analyze
UKnon-life insurance industry data from 1985 to 2010. Specifically, we first use fixed-effects regression to obtain
baseline estimates, and then to explore the channel through which reinsurance-cost of equity relation manifests
itself, we employ Chava and Jarrow’s (2004) logit model to calculate the probability of default of insurers. Our
results show that use of reinsurance lowers the cost of equity, but that the rate of reduction declines as the
level of premiums ceded relative to total gross premiums written increases. This finding supports Froot’s (2007)
contention that risk management is a value-added activity, but that its efficiency diminishes as the associated
hedging costs rise relative to the magnitude of the loss being mitigated. We also find that the reinsurance-cost
of equity relation is moderated by the effect reinsurance has on the risk of financial distress/bankruptcy.
Our research contributes potentially important insights on the interplay between the cost of capital and rein-
surance that might be useful for insurance industry stakeholders, including shareholders, policyholders, and
industry regulators. The study also highlights the effect of risk management, including the use of indemnity
hedges, such as commercial insurance, on the cost of equity in cross-industry contexts. This is particularly ger-
mane given that insurance consumption is significant across industrial sectors of most developed economies
(Lin, Lin, and Zou 2012). In this sense, we expect the results of the present study to have broader appeal beyond
the financial services sector. Additionally, the present study estimates the risk management-cost of equity rela-
tion for both publicly listed and non-publicly listed insurers – the latter being under-represented in previous
cost of capital studies (e.g. see Abudy, Benninga, and Shust 2016).
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background information
on theUK’s non-life insurancemarket and justifies theUK as a domainwithinwhich to focus the study. Section 3
reviews the related risk management literature and develops the research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the
research design employed, including a description of the data, description of the model, and definition of the
variables. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, while section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Institutional background
According to Swiss Re (2018), theUK’s non-life insurancemarket is the fifth largest in the world, comprising 275
active domestically-owned and foreign-owned companies, subsidiaries and branches of varying size, ownership
structure, and product-mix, and currently generates approximately £72 billion (US$93 billion) in gross annual
premiums.1 In addition, 94 active syndicates at the Lloyd’s of London insurance market currently underwrite
direct non-life premiums of roughly £35.5 billion (US$46 billion) per annum, primarily in property and casualty
insurance (Lloyd’s of London 2018).
During the period covered by our study (1985 to 2010), the UK’s insurance industry witnessed regulatory
changes leading to the adoption of a risk principles-based approach to solvency. However, insurance regulation
in the UK has been a ‘lighter touch’ system compared with the risk-based capital solvency requirements prevail-
ing in the United States (US) (Veprauskaite and Adams, 2018). For example, the evolution of the UK’s regulatory
regime has tended not to intervene in any major way with the insurance industry’s capability to innovate and
introduce new products in the market, and raise equity on cost-effective terms. The effect of this difference in
regulatory approach could be interesting in terms of comparing the results of this study with similar US-focused
research (e.g.Wen et al., 2008).Moreover, theUK insurancemarket operates under a unitary (homogenous) reg-
ulatory regime. Again, this situation contrasts with the US insurance market where solvency surveillance is the
responsibility of the state-based regulators. Standards issued by the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners (NAIC) are used in the US to coordinate regulation activity between states. However, as these standards
are not mandatory, there are some regulatory differences between states – for example, in terms of reinsurance
requirements (Cummins and Phillips, 2009). Moreover, US-based insurers are subject to premium rate regula-
tion on certain business lines, such asmotor insurance, which is not the case in the UK (Nelson, 2000). Thus, the
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premiums charged by insurers in the UK’s non-life insurance market are governed mainly by market competi-
tion and not regulatory intervention. These attributes of the UK’s non-life insurancemarket facilitate potentially
‘cleaner’ tests of the hypotheses put forward in this study.
Another important institutional aspect of the UK’s non-life insurance sector is its accounting and financial
reporting practices. During our period of analysis (1985 to 2010), non-life insurers in the UK were required
to produce their annual accounts in accordance with UK generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or
since 2005 International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 4, which intend to present a ‘true and fair’ view of
the financial condition of the company. These set of accounts are also used for calculating the tax liability of the
insurers, and value assets and liabilities at, or close to, their ‘fair’ market values. However, this accounting treat-
ment can induce volatility in period earnings, claim reserves, tax liabilities, and capital adequacy calculations
(Post et al., 2007). The amount recoverable under a reinsurance treaty is, however, independent of common val-
uation parameters, such as interest rates. Hence, reinsurance can be instrumental in reducing volatility induced
bymark-to-market accounting and variations in the use of discretionary reserve accruals across accounting peri-
ods (Veprauskaite and Adams, 2018). Moreover, unlike in the US, the supply of reinsurance in the UK insurance
market is not distorted by discriminatory rules that penalize insurers with higher capital maintenance require-
ments, and hence, higher costs of capital, if they use foreign reinsurers (Cole and McCullough, 2006). This
institutional attribute of using UK insurance industry data further helps us to avoid potentially confounding
effects and enables more direct tests of hypotheses to be carried out. Therefore, UK’s non-life insurance market
is well-suited to the conduct of this research.
3. Related literature and hypotheses development
During the past three decades, the increasing frequency and severity of environmental perils, such as hurricanes,
earthquakes, and floods, have resulted in wide-scale economic losses around the globe. For instance, Low (2019)
reports that in 2018 the global insurance industry suffered insured losses of US$ 80bn, which is significantly
higher than the 30-year average of US$ 41billion. Not only this, past few years have also witnessed an increasing
contribution fromweather related events to total annual losses. This trend of rising losses from catastrophes has
serious implications for the insurance industry, as it can undermine the capital adequacy of insurers to service
the claims of existing customers and to underwrite new business at competitive premiums (Froot, 1999). This
situation could threaten investors’ contractual benefits as it implies an increase in insurers’ insolvency risk, and
a decrease in their future profitability. According to Jean-Baptiste and Santomero (2000), these concerns have
resulted in an increased interest amongst managers, reinsurers, regulators, and others in better understanding
the risk management and pricing techniques employed by the insurance industry, and their implications for
firm value. For non-life insurers, an improved understanding of risk-bearing and risk-financing is particularly
important due to the increased potential for the geographical and product-market concentration of insurable
risks (Froot and O’Connell, 2008).
Prior studies propose several reasons for corporate risk management. According to Smith and Stulz (1985),
tax shield benefits, lower costs of financial distress/bankruptcy, and a reduced probability of underinvestment
following a loss event are amongst the key benefits of corporate hedging in imperfect capital markets. Leland
(1998) adds that the value of the debt-based tax shields and the realization of investment options can be increased
by enhancing debt capacity through hedging. Zou and Adams (2008) come to similar conclusions regarding
the role of commercial property insurance in lowering corporate debt costs and increasing debt capacity. Risk
management studies commonly assume that if financial markets are imperfect then external financing is costlier
than internally generated funds. Froot (2007, p. 273) states that ‘ . . . most financial policy decisions, whether they
concern capital structure, dividends, capital allocation, capital budgeting, or investment and hedging policies,
revolve around the benefits and costs of a corporation holding risk’. Similarly, Smith and Stulz (1985) show that
risk management (hedging) is an element of overall corporate financing policy. Therefore, risk management
and financing decisions are intertwined. Though the risk-return trade-off is (or should be) the basis of strategic
decision-making, the impact of risk management on firm risk and traded value is still a contested issue in the
academic literature.
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3.1. Riskmanagement and value creation
In perfect markets, corporate risk management, including the purchase of insurance, is redundant as sharehold-
ers can efficiently diversify firm-specific risks by holding balanced portfolios of investments (Choi, Mao, and
Upadhyay, 2013). However, in their influential work on the modern theory of corporate insurance, Mayers and
Smith (1982) argue that risk management adds value to a firm if it allows them to mitigate the frictional costs
arising in imperfect markets. For example, a firm facing increased costs of financial distress and/or bankruptcy
is more likely to incur agency problems (e.g. asset-stripping) that benefit the immediate economic utility of
managers rather than the economic interests of shareholders and creditors. Prudent risk management (e.g.
via restrictive insurance covenants and direct monitoring by insurers) can mitigate agency incentive conflicts
and lower the cost of external finance, thus promoting investments in value-enhancing projects. According to
Doherty (2000, p. 9) ‘ . . . hedging complements other sources of financing, internal and external, to replace
destroyed assets and new investments’. Such reasoning has given rise to a sizable body of literature that links
corporate financing decisions to risk management (e.g., see DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995; Froot, 2007; Froot,
Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993). However, most of the empirical evidence to date relates to the use of finan-
cial derivatives by non-financial firms – instruments that unlike indemnity-based reinsurance contracts can
concomitantly be used for both hedging and speculation purposes (Aunon-Nerin and Ehling, 2008).
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993, p. 267) define corporate hedging as ‘ . . . the use of off-balance-sheet instru-
ments – forwards, futures, swaps, and options – to reduce the volatility of firm value’. Reinsurance, however,
is intrinsically different from other financial hedges (e.g., derivative instruments) in at least five key regards.
First, reinsurance is well accounted for in the financial statements submitted to its regulator by an insurer as
claims recoverable from reinsurers are counted as one of the ‘admissible’ assets used to determine capital ade-
quacy. This makes reinsurance well-integrated with the capital structure of an insurer. The second reason that
makes reinsurance different from financial derivatives is that, as an indemnity contract, reinsurance involves the
transfer of ‘downside’ risks making it a pure hedge instrument, which cannot be used for ‘upside’ speculative
purposes (Aunon-Nerin and Ehling, 2008). Campello et al., (2011) note that firms may opt out of their hedging
positions once they have secured sufficient capital from lenders. Third, derivatives contracts can be imperfect
hedges of underlying risks (i.e. they can suffer from basis risk) (Doherty, 2000) However, this problem does not
apply to indemnity reinsurance. The fourth difference between reinsurance and other financial hedges is that
as an indemnity contract assuming an offsetting financial position is not possible with a reinsurance contract
(treaty). Fifth, reinsurance treaties often provide ancillary advisory services, such as the pricing of emerging or
unusual risks, and/or claims handling. These ‘real services’ can also provide added-value for the shareholders
and policyholders of insurance firms (Doherty, 2000).
3.2. Reinsurance and the cost of equity
Sharfman and Fernando (2008) suggest that in the context of a firm’s standing in capital markets, the link
between riskmanagement and the cost of equity is a fundamental strategic issue. The structural relation between
business risk and cost of external funding is a key issue for regulated entities such as insurers, as their invest-
ment opportunity sets are often constrained by regulations. Risk and capitalmanagement are further intertwined
for insurers because they are statutorily mandated to meet minimum capital requirements (Upreti and Adams
2015). There are several reasons for reinsurance to have an effect on the cost of equity of an insurer. For exam-
ple, reinsurance, being a leverage-neutral post-loss financing mechanism,2 enables primary insurers to mitigate
the adverse effects of rising losses such as the increased risks of financial distress and/or bankruptcy (Doherty
and Lamm-Tennant 2009). Doherty and Tinic (1981) further suggest that reinsurance reduces the probabil-
ity of ruin for direct insurance writers. Similarly, Stulz (1996) argues that by reducing the downside financial
distress/bankruptcy risks, risk management (reinsurance) can reduce the cost of equity along with increasing
corporate debt capacity.
Froot and O’Connell (2008) also note that reinsurance is important because compared with equity investors,
the disparate policyholder-customers of insurance firms are less efficient at diversifying risk. As a result, reinsur-
ance provides policyholders with fixed claims on future cash flows with the certainty of indemnification in the
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event of an insured loss. Doherty and Tinic (1981) observe that insured parties by definition are risk-averse and
unable to cost-efficiently diversify away their insurable risks in capital markets. Therefore, exposure to financial
distress/bankruptcy will subject an insurer to reduced new business growth, and hence, loss of profitability, as
well as an increase in the market cost of capital. Reinsurance not only provides protection against the adverse
effects of financial distress, but also generates ‘tax shield’ benefits by stabilizing period earnings and reducing
marginal rates of taxation (Abdul-Kader, Adams and Mouratidis, 2010). According to Modigliani and Miller
(1963), such tax shields can reduce the rate at which cost of equity increases with the increase in leverage. So,
the decision to reinsure can also be viewed as a financing (capital structure) choice decision that provides insur-
ance firms with a form of ‘synthetic equity’ that protects them against severe loss events (e.g. catastrophes) that
can have systematic effects on capital markets (Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003). It is so because major catas-
trophes (e.g. a tsunami in Japan or a terror attack in New York) have global effects on financial markets and
make access to external capital more expensive. The situation is even more challenging for the insurance indus-
try because it pays substantial amounts to cover claims arising from such events, depleting its capital reserves
to cover future losses. In such a scenario, reinsurance enables insurers to protect their risk capital and to access
external financing at favourable rates owing to their better risk profile. The foregoing analysis therefore implies
that:
H1: Other things being equal, reinsured insurers have a lower cost of equity than non-reinsured insurers.
Since there are many ways through which reinsurance affects the cost of equity, a framework is required to
analyze this relation. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) provide a framework for analyzing risk management
decisions in terms of market frictions and the impact of financing policy on firms’ investment decisions. They
argue that cash flow volatility can be costly for shareholders as it increases equity risk, and that by stabilizing
cash flows following unexpected shock events, risk management techniques (reinsurance) enhances the value of
(insurance) firms by enablingmanagers to realize positive net present value (NPV) projects in their firms’ invest-
ment opportunity sets. Plantin (2006) argues that because of reinsurers’ close contractual relations with direct
insurers and their regular monitoring of insurers’ underwriting and claims settlement systems, reinsurance can
serve as an important signalling device to investors, policyholders, regulators, and others as to insurers’ future
financial condition. Shimpi (2002) further contends that the contingent capital properties of (re)insurance can
help lower annual combined loss ratios (i.e. claims plus expenses including commissions as a proportion of net
premiums written) as well as reduce the required level of retained equity capital. The implied market signalling
benefits of reinsurance as a risk assurance device can, therefore, help direct insurance writers to reduce their
equity cost of capital.
Froot and O’Connell (2008) point out, however, that holding too much equity in insurance firms is not only
unproductively expensive for investors, but it also increases the risk of resource misuse and excessive perquisite
consumption bymanagers. In other words, the frictional costs of capital in insurance firms can arise from agency
incentive conflicts between management, owners, and fixed claimants (policyholders) (Laux and Muermann,
2010). Laux and Muermann (2010) further argue that as stock insurance firms invariably raise equity prior to
selling policies, competition in insurance markets limits the amount of equity capital that can be raised at a
cost that maximizes their expected returns on investment. However, as contingent capital, reinsurance can relax
equity limits and help optimize the allocation of capital in insurance firms in a way that financially benefits
shareholders (e.g., see also Froot, 2007). Moreover, reinsurance can become economically advantageous to a
direct insurancewriter in the face of information asymmetries and agency problems such as the underinvestment
and asset substitution incentives which if left unchecked could raise the risk of financial ruin, and therefore,
increase insurers’ costs of capital (Garven and MacMinn, 1993).
Though there are many ways in which reinsurance can affect the cost of equity, the functional form of the
relation is unclear. There are several reasons for the complexity of reinsurance-cost of equity relation. For exam-
ple, Froot (2001) finds that due to market frictions (e.g. information asymmetries and agency costs) the price of
catastrophe reinsurance coverage in the US property-liability insurancemarket often exceeds the actuarial value
of expected losses. Froot and O’Connell (2008) also argue that reinsurance purchased in excess of the optimal
level required by the insurer, can result in ‘deadweight costs’ because of transaction costs, such as reinsurers’
expenses and profit loadings. Similarly, Schrand and Unal (1998) also argue that because of the transaction costs
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involved, the hedging (reinsurance) of core risks can have a deleterious effect on firm value. In a cross-industry
context, Gray, Koh, andTong (2009) argue that a firm’s equity cost of capital is expected to be positively related to
non-diversifiable information risk. Risk management through reinsurance could also increase the agency cost
risk that entrenched managers in insurance firms could denude firm value by allowing them to bypass close
monitoring of financiers and invest in negative net present value (NPV) ‘pet’ projects and/or engage in moral
hazard behaviour (e.g., see Tufano, 1998).
Such reasoning implies that reinsurance can increase the value of an insurer by reducing the cost of equity
capital rather than increasing the future expected cash flows. Therefore, it can be argued that reinsurance, if
purchased in excess of the optimal level required by the insurer, can result in ‘deadweight costs’ because of
the transaction costs and a reinsurer’s expense and profit loadings (Froot and O’Connell 2008). The foregoing
analysis also suggests that if the benefits of risk hedging via reinsurance outweigh the costs, then purchasing
reinsurance should lead to a reduction in the cost of equity. However, as the proportion of ceded premiums
increases, its capacity to lower the cost of equity decreases owing to increase in costs associated with reinsurance.
As a pure risk management device reinsurance is expected to always lower the risk of an insurer, but at relatively
high cession rates increasing costs make it less effective in reducing the cost of equity. This suggests that the
relation between the cost of equity and reinsurance is likely to be non-linear. Therefore, our second hypothesis
is:
H2: Other things being equal, insurers’ costs of equity decreases non-linearly as the level of reinsurance increases.
3.3. Reinsurance and the probability of default
An important reason for purchase of reinsurance is to reduce financial distress/bankruptcy risks and avoid reg-
ulatory intervention in the event of a severe loss (Hoerger, Sloan and Hassan 1990). Not only this, Upreti and
Adams (2015) find that the management of underwriting risks through reinsurance is vital for insurers to com-
pete effectively in product-markets of their specialization. Survey evidence provided by Wakker, Thaler and
Tversky (1997) also suggests that the policyholder-customers of insurance firms expect deep (and dispropor-
tionate) reductions in the premium paid for an insurance policy for any increase in insurers’ probability of
default. As a consequence, reinsurance becomes more important as an post loss financing mechanism due to
these regulatory and operational considerations. According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, the prob-
ability of ruin directly effects the cost of capital of a firm. For example, Li, Lockwood and Miao (2017) find that
higher default probabilities are associated with lower stock returns and higher equity costs of capital because the
managers of highly leveraged financially distressed firms are likely to engage in risk-shifting behaviour, such as
overinvestment in wealth destroying projects. Vassalou and Xing (2004) further find that debt default risk and
its link with the equity cost of capital is intimately related to the size and book-to-market (BM) characteristics of
a firm. Hence, by reducing the probability of financial distress and/or bankruptcy, reinsurance not only enables
insurers to maintain business operations and increase product-market share, but also reduce their market costs
of equity. Consequently:
H3: Other things being equal, reinsurance reduces the insolvency risk of insurers.
4. Data and research design
4.1. Data
The data used in this study are derived from two sources. First, we use – the annual statutory solvency returns
covered by Standard & Poor’s SynThesys UK non-life insurance companies’ database for the 26 years 1985 to
2010. This period, which covered variable macroeconomic conditions, represents the earliest and latest years
for which financial data were available at the time the study was carried out. The SynThesys database does not
provide consolidated returns of group companies as regulations require independently operating and reporting
insurers to file their returns individually, rather than on the basis of groupmembership. In selecting our sample,
we excluded very small insurers (e.g. localmutual fire insurance and professional indemnity pools), closed funds
in ‘run-off’, and public sector insurance arrangements as they do not directly and/or actively write much, if any,
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ongoing insurance business. Additionally, not all firm-year cases in the SynThesys database are usable (e.g. as a
result of missing values). Therefore, we imposed certain selection restrictions to derive a usable panel sample –
for example, accounting values for premiums retained and total assets had to be complete and non-negative for
firm/year observations. This ‘filtering procedure’ also required that the return on assets be greater than – 1 for a
firm-year to be included in the sample. Moreover, to preserve the longitudinal (panel) structure of the dataset,
only insurance firms with two or more years of data are included in the sample. Applying these procedures
thus resulted in an unbalanced, but cross-sectionally representative (e.g., in terms of size, financial structure,
and product-mix), panel sample of 397 insurance firms (5,427 data points) that operated in the UK between
1985 and 2010. Second, our study also used the Thomson Reuters Datastream database to collect data necessary
for calculating the cost of equity. Specifically, data on the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) Non-Life
Insurance Index were used to calculate returns for the UK non-life insurance sector, whereas the FTSE All Share
Index was used for calculating the market return.3
4.2. Cost of equity estimation
There are various techniques for calculating the cost of the equity of a firm of which variants of the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) and Fama and French’s (1997) three-factor (FF3F) model are the most common (Gre-
gory andMichou, 2009); however, their application is often constrained by the availability of requisite data. The
extant academic literature reports that market-based accounting methods provide the most accurate estimates
of the cost of equity as these estimates tend to correspond well with market risk proxies (e.g., see Botosan and
Plumlee, 2005). Since these techniques are by definition market-based, they are useful only for publicly quoted
firms for which long-run earnings and/or dividend forecast data are available for estimating the equity cost of
capital. However, insurance firms listed on the LSE, and/or other major stock exchanges represent only a small
proportion of theUKnon-life insurancemarket (i.e. 27 out of 701UK licensed insurance firms in 2010).4 Results
obtained using a sample of only 27 firms would not be generalizable, therefore, precluding the use of market-
based accounting methods for determining the cost of equity. Accordingly, the Rubinstein-Leland (R-L) model,
a technique based on asset pricing theory was selected for the estimating cost of equity in the present study.
The R-L model, attributed to Rubinstein (1976) and Leland (1999), assumes the log-normality of market
returns, but it does not make any distributional assumptions regarding share returns. Wen et al., (2008) apply
the R-Lmodel to US property-liability insurers, and report that the R-Lmodel, being distribution-free, provides
better estimates of portfolio returns for insurers with highly skewed returns, and/or portfolios of small size. Even
though the R-Lmodel is a market-data based technique, Cummins and Phillips (2005) demonstrate that the R-L
model can be effectively applied to non-listed firms (including mutual insurers) if it is used in conjunction with
the ‘full information beta’ (FIB) technology as described in Kaplan and Peterson (1998).5 Consequently, this
technique does not impose severe limitations on the data in terms of organizational form or the listing status
of the insurance firm – a quality that is desirable in the context of the present study. Indeed, Cummins and
Phillips (2005, p. 447) state that the ‘ . . . FIB methodology produces cost of capital estimates that reflect the line
of business composition of the firm’. Therefore, we estimate industry-level betas for each of sixmain lines of non-
life insurance business written by insurers as the first step of the FIB procedure.6 Cummins and Phillips (2005)
further explain that in arbitrage-free markets, firm value can be considered as the sum of the values of a firm’s
assets across itsmain lines of business (i.e. the so-called value additivity property). As a result, an insurance firm’s
overall CAPM market beta (β i,t) is the sum of the beta coefficients across business lines weighted according to
their proportionate contribution to the firm’s market value. Cummins and Phillips (2005) further note that the
‘sum-beta’ CAPM is particularly appropriate for firms operating in the property-casualty insurance industry.
This is because on average, the stock returns of insurers are more sensitive to financial distress risks (higher
equity costs of capital) than stock returns in general. As a result, insurance firms tend to engage in less frequent
share trading, and hence, less susceptible to equity market price volatilities, than more risk-taking (e.g. high




β jωijt + εit (1)
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In Equation (1) above, ωijt represents the weight of by-line business premiums written by insurance firm ‘i’ in
year ‘t’ as a proportion of annual gross premiums written by the firm in that year; β j represents the beta of each
line of business; and εit is a random error term for firm ‘i’. Since individual business lines are not traded in the
market, the traded value of individual business lines is not known. Therefore, following Kaplan and Peterson
(1998), we use premium income (sales data) for six lines of business at the industry and firm-level to proxy for
the relative weight of each line at the industry-level and firm-level respectively. The assumption is that weighted
premiums are deemed a reasonable proxy for business participation as insurers invest net period income in
assets and reinsure risks in proportion to liabilities reported at balance sheet date.
Within the FIB framework, the initial step using the R-L metric is to calculate an industry-level beta
corresponding to each of the available monthly observations using the following equation:
β = Cov[Ri,−(1 + Rm)
−b]
Cov[Rm,−(1 + Rm)−b]
where, b = 1
2
+ E[ln(1 + Rm)] − ln(1 + Rf )
Var[ln(1 + Rm)] (2)
The term ‘b’ in equation (2) represents the degree of risk aversion.8 Additionally, the three key inputs required
for estimating equation (2) are: Ri – the return on a portfolio of non-life insurance companies;Rf – the return on
the risk-free asset, and Rm – the return on the market portfolio. The proxies used for these three variables were
obtained using data fromDatastream. The FTSE-350Non-life Insurance Index was used to proxyRi, the average
monthly return for the insurance industry. Data on this index are available fromDecember 1985 onwards. Since
the monthly returns on UK government Treasury bills of one month maturity precisely matches the duration
of returns on the insurance industry index and the market index, it was used as a proxy for the risk-free rate
Rf . Similarly, the return on the FTSE-All-Share Price Index is used to approximate the average monthly market
return. It is important to note here that there is a mismatch of the duration of data available on the FTSE-
350 Non-Life Insurance Index, which is based on data from December 1985 and the data available from the
SynThesys database. Therefore, to avoid losing one year’s data in the estimation, the bootstrap method utilizing
the full sample of available returns was employed to estimate the yearly industry beta for each year from 1985 to
2010. In the next step of this procedure, using the yearly betas for individual firms, the risk premia for individual
insurance firms for each year in the study period were calculated using equation (3) below:
RPi,t = βi,t(Rm − Rf ) (3)
The long-run average of the market risk premium used in the equation above as short-term estimates of
the equity risk premium could be confounded by period-specific environmental (e.g. macroeconomic) events
(Koller, Goedhart, and Wessels 2010). Therefore, to incorporate the long-run estimates of the equity risk pre-
mium, the risk premium of 5.23%, as reported in Kyriacou, Madsen and Mase (2006), is used as a proxy. Using
the arithmetic mean, Kyriacou, Madsen andMase (2006) calculate the historical risk premium using UK corpo-
rate data from the year 1900 to 2002. The yearly risk premia so calculated for each firm in the estimation sample
thus serve as the dependent variable for testing hypotheses 2 and 3.
4.3. Variables
Since the cost of equity reflects investors’ risk preferences (O’Hanlon and Steele, 2000), it can be influenced
by various factors that have an effect on perceived market risk. In this context, the level of reinsurance can
be a major factor in defining the riskiness and risk appetite of an insurer (Hoerger, Sloan and Hassan 1990).
Since this research study aims to explain the effect of reinsurance on the cost of the equity of the insurers, the
principal explanatory variables (i.e. the decision to reinsure and the extent of reinsurance) used in this research
are derived from the premiums ceded to the reinsurers. To test the ‘reinsurance participation’ hypothesis, an
indicator variable, named REINID, which takes value 1 if an insurance firm cedes premiums to a reinsurer, and 0
otherwise, is used. In the current study, 376 sample insurance firms (95%of the full panel sample) use reinsurance
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Table 1. UK property-liability insurers, 1986–2010: definition of variables.
Variable Represents Description
RPi,t Equity Risk Premium Annual equity risk premium for an insurer.
REINSi,t Level of reinsurance ceded Amount of reinsurance premiums ceded in year t divided by the gross insurance premiums written
in year t.
LEVi,t Leverage Net provisions scaled by reported capital resources in year t
LIQi,t Level of cash holdings Ratio of cash (& cash equivalents) to total assets in year t.
SIZEi,t Firm size Natural log of total assets in year t.
HINDX Line of business Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index
Sum of square of share of each line in a firm’s annual premiums written.
TLTAi,t Ameasure of leverage Ratio of annual total liability to annual total assets.
NITAi,t Ameasure of profitability Ratio of annual net income to annual total assets.
BPROBi,t Probability of bankruptcy Probability of bankruptcy of an insurer obtained using ‘private firm model’ of Chava and Jarrow
(2004).
Altman Z Altman Z-score It is an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy and is calculated as
6.56X1+ 3.26X2+ 6.72X3+ 1.05X4, where X1 to X3 respectively represent ratios of
working capital, retained earnings and EBIT to total assets; whereas X4 is the ratio of the book
values of equity and total liabilities.
Z-score An inverse proxy for the
probability of bankruptcy
(ROA+ capital to asset ratio) divided by the standard deviation of ROA
This table presents the labels of the key variables used in the study together with their full description.
with approximately 93% of the firm-year observations (5,063 out of 5,427) reporting reinsurance data. To gauge
the extent of reinsurance used by insurers relative to the gross premiums written at the total business level, the
ratio of premiums ceded to gross premiums written (hereafter the ‘reinsurance ratio’) is employed. The variable
label REINS denotes the reinsurance ratio given in Table 1 below.
Prior research studying the link between the cost of equity and firm risk characteristics (e.g. Botosan 1997;
Botosan and Plumlee 2005; Gregory andMichou 2009) predicts a positive link between leverage (increased risk
of financial distress/bankruptcy) and the equity cost of capital. This view is consistent with various theories
of capital structure, such as trade-off theory. Following these studies, leverage (LEV) – net provisions scaled
by total assets – is used here as an explanatory variable for the equity risk premium. Fama and French (1995)
demonstrate that firm size is a significant factor in determining the risk premium demanded by investors. In
Fama and French’s (1997) three-factor (FF3F) model, firm size is predicted to be inversely related to the cost
of equity because larger firms tend to have greater access to capital markets than smaller firms; plus, they are
usually more diversified in terms of both their geographical scope of operations and product-markets. Botosan,
Plumlee and Wen (2011) define firm size as the natural logarithm of the market value of the firm. However,
this measure is not possible in this study as most of the firms in our panel sample (around 95% on average) are
not publicly-traded entities. Therefore, the natural logarithm of the total assets is used to proxy for firm size. We
consider that this is a reasonable proxy for firm size for twomain reasons. First, during our period of analysis UK
insurers were required by regulation to regularly (at least annually) mark their assets to ‘fair’ market values for
statutory solvency monitoring and (under IFRS 4) for financial reporting purposes. Second, a large proportion
of non-life insurers’ assets are marketable (liquid) securities which are by necessity reported at, or close to, their
tradable values.
Insurers, being financial intermediaries, face significant liquidity risks on their balance sheets (Borde, Cham-
bliss andMadura 1994). Liquidity risks arise when insurers’ investments (usually in marketable securities which
are exposed to interest rate, market equity, and credit risks) are unable tomeet an increased demand for liquidity
in the aftermath of a major catastrophe. Borde, Chambliss and Madura (1994) report that liquidity has a posi-
tive and statistically significant relation with an insurer’s risk, and that low liquidity levels could lead to a riskier
investment strategy that promises greater than average market rates of return. To account for this possibility, the
ratio of reported liquid assets (cash and cash equivalents) to total assets (LIQ), is used to measure liquidity risk.
As LIQ is an inverse measure of liquidity risk, we expect this coefficient estimate to be negative.
Another important consideration in determining firm-level risk is the level of product-market diversification
of the firm. For example, Cole and McCullough (2006, p.176) assert that ‘ . . . differences in the lines of business
sold affect a firm’s investment opportunities, earnings volatility, and overall level of risk’. Huang et al., (2010)
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report that there is a significantly positive relation between the conditional idiosyncratic volatility estimated from
monthly data and expected returns. Since a diversified insurance firm is likely to have lower return volatility, a
Herfindahl index (HINDX) is used in this study to measure product diversification in accordance with prior
insurance industry research (e.g., see Mayers and Smith, 1990). This variable (HINDX) is defined as the sum of
squares of the premiums generated by individual lines of business as a proportion of the total premiums written
at the total business level. In other words, for a firm ‘i’ operating in ‘N’ different lines of insurance in a given year








where j represents the number of lines. (4)
An HINDX close to 0 represents a highly diversified company, whereas for a ‘pure-play’ company, this index is
equal to 1. Since a diversified company is expected to be less risky, the cost of equity is expected be an increasing
function of HINDX. On the other hand, Shim (2011) provides evidence that more product-focused insurers,
on a risk adjusted basis, outperform the product-diversified insurers. Therefore, there can be a negative relation
between the equity risk premium and the degree of product -line diversification.
4.4. Models
To testH1, which relates the cost of equity to themanagerial decision to reinsure, the followingmodel is specified:
RPit = βREINIDit + γ LEVit + ϕSIZEit + ρLIQit + θHINDXit + εit (5)
Equation (5) is similar (but not identical) to the models used by Botosan and Plumlee (2005) and Botosan,
Plumlee andWen (2011) to compare the relative accuracy of the cost of equity estimates obtained using different
techniques. Themodel in the Equation (4) above is based on the idea that the level of risk undertaken by investors
must be priced in the cost of equity; hence, the factors that can affect this risk indicator must be accounted
for in the model. All the variables in Equation (5) above are described in Table 1, while the last term εit , in
the Equation (5) represents an error term that comprises unobserved firm-specific effects (e.g. between firm
variations in managerial quality) (αi); time-specific shocks (e.g. macroeconomic changes) (νt); and a random
(‘white noise’) disturbance (ηit). That is:
εit = αi + νt + ηit (6)
In the presence of firm-specific effects, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator can be biased and inconsistent
(Greene 2003). For instance, firm-effects can introduce a downward bias in estimates of standard errors, andmay
result in an upward bias in themagnitude of estimated t-statistics, which in turn leads to a statistical significance
being assigned to variables that may not in actual fact be significant (Greene 2003). To control for firm-effects,
we use the fixed-effects estimator, with standard errors corrected for clustering within firms to control for the
downward bias in standard errors (Wooldridge 2002). This approach is consistent with the recommendations
of Gormley and Matsa (2014) who argue that the fixed-effects estimator is more consistent than other common
procedures, such as ‘industry-adjusting’ (demeaning), that are used for controlling unobserved heterogeneity.
Moreover, we use year-dummies in our regressions to control for time-specific effects, including underwriting
cycles.9
H2 predicts that the relation between the cost of equity of insurance firms and the extent of reinsurancewill be
non-linear. To capture non-linearity, we include an interaction term in our equation by first creating an indicator
(dummy) variable based on the median value of reinsurance ratio (0.242), which takes the value 1 if reinsurance
ratio is higher than the median, and 0 otherwise. Next, we interact this dummy variable with the reinsurance
ratio variable to construct a variable REINSINT which captures the non-linearity of the slope between the obser-
vations above and below themedian value of reinsurance ratio. This variable enters the regression equation along
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with the reinsurance ratio. The baseline model is given in Equation (7) below as:
RPit = β1REINSit + β2REINSINTit + γ LEVit + ϕSIZEit + ρLIQit + θHINDXit + εit (7)
However, as reinsurance is a key element of the capital structure of insurance companies, there is the potential
for endogeneity in the specified model (Cole and McCullough 2006). For example, a higher degree of corporate
leverage could lead to a higher demand for reinsurance, which in turn increases the underwriting capacity of the
insurer leading to a further increase in leverage. Eventually, this leverage-effect is likely to result in a higher cost of
equity capital. Indeed, Shiu (2011) recognizes this potential endogeneity issue with reinsurance and controls for
it using an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Therefore, we test for endogeneity using Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test to establish whether, or not, an IV analysis is required.
4.5. Reinsurance and the probability of bankruptcy
In H3, we propose that reinsurance lowers the cost of equity by reducing the probability of ruin. To test this
we need to establish that the probability of bankruptcy is a key determinant of the cost of equity. Therefore, we
employ the following model specified in Equation (10) below:
RPit = αi + λBPROBit + β1REINSit + β2REINSINTit + ϕSIZEit + ρLIQit + θHINDXit + εit (8)
We use both direct and inverse measures of the probability of bankruptcy. To directly measure the probability
of bankruptcy, we use a model derived from the logit model proposed by Shumway (2001). This method uses
a dummy (BDUMMY) as the dependent variable, which takes value 1 to indicate a bankrupt firm in a given
year and 0 to indicate a solvent firm. Chava and Jarrow (2004) show that this model has superior forecasting
performance compared with Altman’s (1968) z-score model. We then follow the ‘private firm model’ of Chava
and Jarrow (2004), which uses net income to total assets ratio (NITA) and total liability to total assets ratio
(TLTA) as explanatory variables, which can mathematically be described in Equation (11) as:
BDUMMYi,t = αi + TLTAi,t + NITAi,t + εi,t (9)
To control for the potentially confounding effects of outliers in the data set, we winsorize these variables at
the 1st and 99th percentiles at the left-hand and right-hand tails, respectively. Post-regression, we estimate the
probability of bankruptcy, BPROB, for each firm using the logistic function. The predicted value is then used in
Equation (10) above to test for relation between the probability of bankruptcy (BPROB) and the cost of equity.We
expect to find a positive relation between the two, as predicted by the trade-off theory of capital structure (Hen-
nessy and Whited, 2005). Since TLTA, a measure of leverage, is used as an explanatory variable for predicting
probability of bankruptcy, we do not include LEV in Equation (10) in order to mitigate the risk of endogeneity.
We then estimate the relation between reinsurance ratio and BPROB using Equation (12) below:
BPROBit = αi + βREINSit + γ LEVit + ϕSIZEit + ρLIQit + θHINDXit + εit (10)
Additionally, two alternative definitions of the Z-score are used as inverse measures of the probability of
bankruptcy in this study. The first Z-score measure is based on the following equation from Altman (2013),
suitable for non-manufacturing firms:
Altman Zit = 6.56X1it + 3.26X2it + 6.72X3it + 1.05X4it (11)
where variables X1 to X3 are defined as ratios of working capital; retained earnings; and earnings before interest
and taxes (EBIT) to total assets respectively, while X4 is defined as the ratio of the book value of equity to book
value of total liabilities. An alternative version of the Z-score is calculated as the sum of the return on assets
(ROA) and the capital to asset ratio scaled by the standard deviation of ROA.10 We predict the relation between
reinsurance ratio and the probability of bankruptcy to be negative, i.e. that the purchase of reinsurance reduces
the probability of ruin for insurance firms.
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5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Univariate statistics pertaining to the continuous variables in our panel sample are presented in Table 2.
The first main variable listed in Table 2 is the equity risk premium, RP, estimated using the R-L model. This
variable denotes the excess return over the risk-free rate demanded by investors to invest in an insurance firm;
relevant values range from a minimum of 4.63% to a maximum of 6.91% with a mean value of 5.65%. This
variable is homogenously distributed over the entire panel sample as the median value of 5.67% is very close to
the overall mean indicating a low level of skewness in the panel data set. A modest value of the overall standard
deviation (0.52%) relative to the mean suggests that the variable shows a low degree of variability around the
mean. This indicates that the insurers in our panel sample have similar business risk profiles. The second key
variable listed in Table 2 is the reinsurance ratio, REINS, which ranges from a minimum of 0 to maximum of
1. The smaller this ratio, the lower the volume of premiums ceded to reinsurers relative to gross premiums
written at the total business level. A high value of the ratio is equivalent to a high rate of outwards reinsurance,
indicative of an insurer either closed to new business and in ‘run-off’ or in a state of financial distress. Given the
aforementioned sampling procedure that we employed, most of the insurance firms in the estimation sample are
expected to be ‘going concerns’, resulting in moderate values of reinsurance ratio. Nonetheless, there is a small
minority of insurers left in the panel sample that have large values of the reinsurance ratio compared with the
mean and median values of 0.32 and 0.26 respectively. Unlike the equity risk premium, the reinsurance ratio
shows a higher variation relative to its mean with the standard deviation being 0.28.
Leverage (LEV) is the next relevant variable reported in Table 2, and ranges from 0 to 1617.5. This suggests
the presence of both new entrants, and highly leveraged insurance firms in the panel data set. The overall stan-
dard deviation at 22.78 is several times the mean of 2.62 indicating substantial variation in leverage within the
estimation sample, while a higher mean (2.62) than median figure (1.40) shows that the distribution of this
variable is positively skewed. We winsorize LEV at the 1st and 99th percentile levels at both tails of the sam-
ple distribution to avoid the potentially confounding effects of extreme values (outliers) of this variable in our
regression analysis. Post-winsorization, leverage (WLEV) has a mean of 2.12, which is closer to the median with
substantial changes in the minimum and maximum values.
The variable representing insurance firm size (SIZE) given in Table 2 is, as noted earlier, calculated as the nat-
ural logarithm of total assets reported by an insurer in a year. Such a transformation serves two purposes. First,
since the total assets of a firm in an industry are log-normally distributed, the logarithmic transformation results
in a ‘near’ normally distributed variable. Second, the scaling of total assets is achieved by this transformation,
Table 2. UK property-liability insurers, 1986–2010: descriptive statistics.
Variable MEAN SD MEDIAN MIN MAX OBS FIRMS AVG. TIME
RP 5.655 0.520 5.665 4.629 6.915 5427 397 13.67
REINS 0.312 0.277 0.242 0.000 1.000 5427 397 13.67
REINSINT 0.264 0.311 0.000 0.000 1.000 5427 397 13.67
LEV 2.624 22.798 1.400 0.000 1617.500 5427 397 13.67
WLEV 2.122 2.966 1.400 0.007 24.670 5427 397 13.67
LIQ 0.757 0.186 0.795 0.002 1.625 5427 397 13.67
WLIQ 0.757 0.184 0.795 0.052 1.000 5427 397 13.67
SIZE 11.018 1.965 10.900 5.242 17.566 5427 397 13.67
HINDX 0.666 0.277 0.636 0.158 1.000 5427 397 13.67
BPROB 0.023 0.064 0.008 0.000 0.771 6821 455 14.99
TLTA 0.449 0.221 0.474 0.000 0.953 5427 397 13.67
WTLTA 0.449 0.221 0.474 0.004 0.953 5427 397 13.67
NITA 0.028 0.145 0.024 −2.857 3.929 5418 397 13.65
WNITA 0.026 0.100 0.024 −0.490 0.482 5418 397 13.65
Altman Z 4.264 1.429 4.167 −3.254 10.047 5418 397 13.65
Z-Score 11.136 12.070 8.960 −10.859 312.412 5418 397 13.65
This table reports the overall descriptive statistics of all variables defined in Table 1 for the entire period of
analysis. Variables with prefix ‘W’ (e.g. WLEV) have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles at left
and right tails, respectively.
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whichmakes the results easier to interpret. The size of the firms in the estimation sample, measured using the log
of monetary value of total assets, ranges from 5.70 (approximately £0.3million) to 16.62 (£16.5 billion). Interest-
ingly, the between and within-standard deviations in size are of similar magnitude at 6.54 and 6.27, respectively.
This indicates that within-sample variation in firm size in a given year is of the same scale as the variation in
the size of insurance firms over the full study period (1985 to 2010). The ‘well-behaved’ distribution of this vari-
able is also reflected in qualitatively similar mean and median values at 11.02 and 10.9, respectively. In addition,
the overall standard deviation of this variable at 1.96 suggests that this variable has little variation relative to its
mean.
Liquidity, denoted by LIQ in Table 2, is another important variable used in this study, and reflects the level
of cash and easily convertible cash equivalents in the asset mix of an insurer in a given year. This variable is
bounded between 0 and 1 as it is not possible to have negative values of liquid assets or to have liquid assets
greater in value than total assets in an accounting period. Again, to eliminate the potentially confounding effects
of extreme values, LIQ is winsorized at the at 1st and 99th percentile levels at both tails. Post-winsorization, all
values of this variable are within the aforementioned plausible range. Product diversification is listed in Table 2 as
HINDX, and corresponds to the annual value of the Herfindahl index calculated for each insurance firm. About
54% (213 out of 397) of the insurance firms in the estimation sample conducted their business as mono-line
companies (HINDX of 1) for at least one year during the study period. Similar, but relatively large magnitudes
of the mean (0.66) and median (0.64) statistics, indicate that less diversified insurers are more prevalent in our
data set. In other words, most insurers operating in the UK non-life insurance market tend to specialize in a few
niche lines of business rather than diversifying across all potential product-markets. However, there are a few
well diversified insurers in the estimation sample with the minimum value ofHINDX being 0.16.
5.2. Multivariate results
H1 is tested using Equation (4) above. Panel A of Table 3 reports the relevant coefficient estimates and diag-
nostics, and they confirm the presence of both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in our dataset. To counter
standard error bias, we follow the procedure in Driscoll and Kraay (1998), which controls for both arbitrary spa-
tial and temporal dependence in panel data analyzed using the fixed-effects estimator. The coefficient estimate
for REINID, which indicates the decision to reinsure or not, is negative and statistically significant (p ≤ 0.01,
1-tailed). This result supports H1 that insurers utilizing reinsurance for risk management generally have smaller
equity risk premiums (cost of equity) comparedwith insurers that do not purchase reinsurance. This observation
therefore supports the view that reinsurance (risk management) can add value to insurance firms by enabling
them to optimize capital structure, and so lower their equity cost of capital.
As expected, the winsorized value of leverage, WLEV, is positively and significantly related to the cost of
equity. Specifically, WLEV has an estimated coefficient of 0.006 with a 1-tailed p-value of less than 0.05. This
finding conforms to traditional theories of capital structure which suggest that the cost of equity is an increasing
function of leverage, as increased indebtedness leads to increased frictional costs, such as costs associated with
financial distress/bankruptcy, resulting in a higher equity risk premium (Chen and King, 2014). In accordance
with what we predicted, Table 3 also shows that holding a relatively higher proportion of cash and cash equiv-
alents in the asset mix reduces the equity risk premium of insurers. This result indicates that as highlighted in
Laux and Muermann (2010), although insurance is primarily a solvency-focused business, liquidity risk, and
its implications for the cost of capital is also an important strategic consideration for insurers. Table 3 however
shows that firm size and degree of product diversification do not have a statistically significant effect on the
equity risk premium, but the signs of these coefficient estimates are nevertheless in the predicted direction.
The test results for H2 are presented in Panel B of Table 3. They show that the coefficient estimate forREINS is
negative and statistically significant (at p ≤ 0.01, 1-tail); that is, reinsurance is associated with a lower equity risk
premium. However, for insurers purchasing higher than the median level of reinsurance (approximately 24% of
gross premiumswritten), the empirical relation is weaker comparedwith insurers that cede a lower proportion of
premium underwritten to their reinsurance partners. In economic terms, this means that a one percent increase
in premiums ceded is associated with nearly a 29 basis points drop in the equity risk premium; yet the drop
tapers-off to 5 basis points for insurers ceding more than 24% of their gross premiums written. This suggests
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Table 3. UK property-liability insurers, 1986–2010: fixed-effects estimates.
Panel A
Two-tailed test One-tailed test
Variable Coeff. Robust Std. Error Z p-value χ2 p-value
REINID −0.065 0.031 −2.05 0.04 4.22 0.02
WLEV 0.006 0.002 3.70 0.00 13.67 0.00
WLIQ −0.066 0.038 −1.74 0.08 3.01 0.04
SIZE −0.006 0.008 −0.74 0.46 0.55 0.23




Diagnostics Wooldridge test for first order autocorrelation in panel data
F(1, 373) 208.389 p-value 0.00
Modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity
χ2 (397) 3.9E+ 34 p-value 0.00
Hausman test to choose between fixed and random effects estimation
χ2 (30) 49.53 p-value 0.01
Panel B
Two-tailed test One-tailed test
Variable Coeff. Robust Std. Error Z p-value χ2 p-value
REINS −0.287 0.077 −3.74 0.00 13.98 0.00
REINSINT 0.236 0.065 3.64 0.00 13.28 0.00
WLEV 0.006 0.002 3.64 0.00 13.21 0.00
WLIQ −0.069 0.040 −1.74 0.08 3.03 0.04
SIZE −0.009 0.008 −1.11 0.27 1.22 0.13




Diagnostics Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity of REINS
χ2 (1) 1.10 p-value 0.29
Modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity
χ2 (397) 1.2E+34 p-value 0.00
Hausman test to choose between fixed and random effects estimation
χ2 (31) 57.26 p-value 0.00
This table presents the results of the fixed-effects estimation that tests the effects of the reinsurance ratio on the annual risk premium of non-life
insurers operating in the UK’s non-life insurance market. Panel A reports the results of reinsurance participation decision and Panel B presents
the results of the reinsurance volume decision. Also reported are the results of diagnostic tests to detect presence of heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation in panel data. All variables are as defined in Table 1. Both two-tailed and one-tailed test statistics for each explanatory variable
have been reported in the table.
that the relation between the equity risk premium and the reinsurance ratio is negative but non-linear. It is well
established that reinsurance can increase the underwriting capacity, and an increase in underwriting activity can
result in a higher leverage (e.g. see Abdul-Kader, Adams and Mouratidis 2010). Moreover, reinsurance is costly,
and so at relatively higher levels of cession rates reinsurance is less cost-effective in reducing the cost of equity
capital. Nevertheless, this result accords with Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011) who show that risk hedging
can reduce both the total and systematic risks of firms. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reported in panel B of
Table 3 shows that reinsurance-cost of equity relation is not endogenous, which obviates the need for additional
regressions to treat endogeneity.11
There can be many channels through which reinsurance-cost of equity relation can manifest itself – one of
which is to via the costs of financial distress/bankruptcy. The mediating-effects of financial distress/bankruptcy
costs on the reinsurance-cost of equity relation are reported in Table 4. Panel A of Table 4 presents the results
of a logit regression that employs the aforementioned ‘private firm’ model of Chava and Jarrow’s (2004). Using
this method, we derive estimates of each insurer’s probability of bankruptcy using a logistic transformation, and
running the estimates in a fixed-effects estimator using themodel specified inEquation (10). The results obtained
are reported in Panel B of Table 4, and they reveal that the predicted probability of bankruptcy is positively related
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Table 4. UK property-liability insurers, 1986–2010: probability of bankruptcy and equity risk premium.
Panel A
Variable Coeff. Std. Error Z p-value
WTLTA 5.543 0.607 9.13 0.00
WNITA −5.814 0.801 −7.26 0.00




Two-tailed test One-tailed test
Variable Coeff. Robust Std. Error Z p-value χ2 p-value
BPROB 0.243 0.107 2.27 0.02 5.16 0.01
REINS −0.289 0.077 −3.75 0.00 14.06 0.00
REINSINT 0.238 0.065 3.67 0.00 13.50 0.00
WLIQ −0.074 0.040 −1.85 0.07 3.41 0.03
SIZE −0.007 0.008 −0.89 0.38 0.78 0.19





Two-tailed test One-tailed test
Variable Coeff. Robust Std. Error Z p-value χ2 p-value
REINS −0.011 0.002 −4.96 0.00 24.64 0.00
WLEV 0.007 0.001 12.00 0.00 143.91 0.00
WLIQ 0.003 0.004 0.74 0.46 0.55 0.77
SIZE 0.000 0.001 0.12 0.91 0.01 0.55




Panel A presents the results of logit model of Chava and Jarrow (2004) used for predicting probability of bankruptcy. Panel B reports the fixed
effects estimates of probability of bankruptcy on the equity risk premium. Panel C reports the results of fixed effects estimation of effect of
reinsurance on probability of bankruptcy. Standard errors used in Panels B and C were obtained using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) method.
All variables are as defined in Table 1. Both two-tailed and one-tailed test statistics for each explanatory variable have been reported in the
table.
to the equity risk premium. These findings support the trade-off theory of capital structure (e.g. Hennessy and
Whited, 2005), which suggests that firm-level bankruptcy risk is priced in the financial markets. Although it
can be argued that idiosyncratic risks, such as the risk of financial distress/bankruptcy, can be diversified away
by investors, there is an increasing body of evidence that finds that default risk at firm-level is important. For
example, Bartram, Brown and Stulz (2012, 1330) also state that ‘ . . . idiosyncratic risk is important for the large
numbers of investors who are imperfectly diversified’.
The other coefficient estimates reported in Panel B of Table 4 are similar to the results reported in Table 3,
while the results reported in Panel C of Table 4 confirm that reinsurance is related to reduced probability of ruin.
This suggests that reinsurance reduces the cost of equity by lowering the costs of financial distress/bankruptcy.
Table 4, panel C also reports that the probability of financial distress/bankruptcy increaseswith leverage, whereas
it decreases with the degree of product diversification. As with the equity risk premium, the results in Table 4
indicate that the size of the insurer does not have any statistically significant effect on the probability of ruin.
5.3. Robustness tests
To establish the consistency and reliability of the financial distress/bankruptcy risk channel through which rein-
surance impacts the cost of equity, we conduct additional regression tests using two alternative definitions of the
Z-score variable. These results are presented in Table 5.
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Table 5. UK property-liability insurers, 1986–2010: equity risk premium and the Z-score.
Panel A
Variable Coeff. Robust Std. Error Coeff. Robust Std. Error




REINS −0.426∗∗∗ 0.095 −0.427∗∗∗ 0.095
−4.47 −4.47
REINSINT 0.33∗∗∗ 0.082 0.331∗∗∗ 0.082
4.02 4.01
WLEV 0.006∗ 0.004 0.005 0.003
1.8 1.51
WLIQ 0.038 0.047 0.044 0.047
0.8 0.93
SIZE −0.011 0.010 −0.012 0.010
−1.07 −1.14
HINDX 0.004 0.050 0.001 0.050
0.08 0.02
Year Dummies Yes Yes
No. Observations 5418 5418
No. Firms 397 397
Panel B
Altman Z-score Z-score
Variable Coeff. Robust Std. Error Coeff. Robust Std. Error
REINS 0.784∗∗∗ 0.132 2.549∗∗∗ 0.316
5.93 8.08
WLEV −0.234∗∗∗ 0.031 −0.509∗∗∗ 0.072
−7.48 −7.05
WLIQ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.221 1.306∗∗ 0.541
3.59 2.42
SIZE −0.061 0.043 −0.056 0.095
−1.41 −0.58
HINDX 0.131 0.169 1.075∗∗ 0.509
0.78 2.11
Year Dummies Yes Yes
No. Observations 5418 5418
No. Firms 397 397
Panel A presents the results of fixed-effects regressions of the equity risk premium on the Z-score calculated using two alternative definitions.
Both Z-score variables are inverse measures of the bankruptcy risk. Superscripts ∗; ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and
1% level respectively (two-tail). Panel B reports the fixed-effects results of regressing the Z-score on the reinsurance ratio and other variables.
All variables are as defined in Table 1.
Table 5 corroborates the results obtained in Table 4 as both Z-scores (inverse measures of the probability of
bankruptcy) in panel A have negative and statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that the risk premium
decreases with increasing Z-score (lower bankruptcy risk). Additionally, reinsurance ratio is positively related
to both measures of the Z-score as shown in panel B of Table 5, suggesting that use of reinsurance lowers the
probability of financial distress and bankruptcy.
6. Conclusions
To summarize, we find that use of reinsurance (risk management) is associated with lower equity risk premium,
but that the empirical relation between reinsurance and the equity risk premium is non-linear. As we predicted, a
main explanatory variable – leverage – is also found to be positively related to the cost of equity across amajority
of the estimations conducted in this study. In fact, it is well documented in the finance literature that leverage
increases the risk default, and as a result, leads to an increase in the cost of equity. In line with expectations,
insurers having more liquid assets relative to their stated total assets also tend to have a lower cost of equity, as
higher liquidity levels improve investors’ confidence that the insurance firm is relatively immune to unexpected
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losses to productive assets. However, a greater level of product-market diversification and larger firm size are
found not to have a statistically significant and consistent effect on equity risk premium of insurers.
We conclude from our analysis that the use of optimal capital structure theory-based arguments best explain
the use of reinsurance by non-life insurers. The empirical results obtained in this study support the contention
(H1) that corporate users of reinsurance in the UK’s relatively ‘light touch’ non-life insurance sector (e.g. at
least as compared with the ‘alien reinsurance’ regime operating in the US) have a comparatively lower cost
of equity than their counterparts without reinsurance. This could reflect that investors in the UK’s non-life
insurance market incorporate the risk reduction achieved by diversification through reinsurance in their return
expectations. As predicted by the ‘reinsurance volume decision’ hypothesis (H2), our study finds that there is
a non-linear relation between the extent of reinsurance use and the insurers’ cost of equity. This result accords
with the theoretical predictions which suggest that risk management can be a value-added activity, but that its
efficiency diminishes as the associated costs rise relative to the magnitude of the loss being mitigated. We thus
conclude that reinsurance is an important strategic instrument that insurers can use to optimize their capital
structure in imperfect markets. We also observe that the equity risk premium has a positive link with the risks
(costs) of financial distress/bankruptcy, but that reinsurance can reduce the equity risk premium by reducing
the probability of ruin. Thus, a reduction in the costs of financial distress/bankruptcy is a key channel through
which reinsurance reduces the cost of equity.
Many studies use financial derivatives to explain the impact of risk management on firm value. However,
derivatives’ data are not only ‘noisy’ and difficult to interpret, but may not be able to eliminate the risk exposure
completely. In contrast, the current study focuses on reinsurance which is a pure hedge (indemnity) mecha-
nism. This feature allows us to conduct a direct empirical test of the cost of equity-risk management relation.
In this regard, the study provides a solid basis for further academic research on the role of corporate hedging,
particularly the use of insurance, in influencing the market value of firms. To the best of our knowledge, the
present study is the first to combine the full information beta method of Kaplan and Peterson (1998) with the
non-parametric method of equity beta estimation described in Wen et al., (2008) to arrive at a firm-level equity
risk premia. This is a novel technique for the cost of equity estimation that encompasses all organizational forms
and accounts for all the ‘moments’ of the equity return distribution. This allows the cost of equity estimates to
incorporate all the risk factors priced by investors while concomitantly optimizing sample size. As a result, our
study also makes a prospectively useful methodological contribution to the literature.
We believe that the findings of this research provide useful insights for assessing an insurance firm’s future
profitability, riskiness, and market value. The empirical evidence provided by this study suggests that investors
take account of reinsurance purchased in assessing risks associated with an insurer’s business, and thus, in pric-
ing its securities. Managers can also use this information to optimize corporate capital structure, and minimize
the prospective cost of equity, and other frictional costs arising due to market imperfections. Moreover, an opti-
mal reinsurance (risk management) policy can reduce the level of retained share capital that can maximize
reported returns on invested capital. This insight could help policyholders and shareholders to make better-
informed financial decisions, and assist industry regulators to design and develop capital maintenance rules.
These attributes are potentially portable not only to other financial firms (e.g. banks) but also to non-financial
firms that actively and routinely purchase insurance.
Notes
1. In 2016/17 there were 451 non-life insurers authorized to operate in the UK; however only approximately two-thirds of these
entities actively underwrite and report insurance business. Non-active/non-reporting insurance operatives include amiscellany
of structures, such as closed funds in run-off, ‘brass plate’ branches of European financial institutions with ‘passport rights’ to
write (but not retain and report) business in the UK, and protection and indemnity pools that do not underwrite third party
risks.
2. Since reinsurance is a binding contract, reinsurers will have to pay their share of losses irrespective of the level of financial
leverage of the direct insurance writer. In contrast, increased leverage following a significant loss event will result in an increased
risk of financial distress/bankruptcy, and therefore, a higher cost of capital for the primary insurer.
3. The FTSE-350Non-life Insurance Index is amarket-capitalization weighted index of all the companies in the non-life insurance
sector of the FTSE 350 Index. The index was developed with a base value of 1,000 as of December 31, 1985. The FTSE-All-Share
is a market-capitalization weighted index representing the performance of all eligible companies listed on the London Stock
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Exchange’s (LSE’s)mainmarket, that pass screening for firm size and liquidity. The FTSE-All-Share Index covers approximately
98% of the UK’s total market capitalization.
4. A minority of the insurance firms included in our panel sample (e.g. Allianz) are quoted on the main stock exchanges based in
the country of their respective parent companies (e.g. Germany). We treat corporate subsidiaries as stand-alone firms as they
have to maintain the same capital maintenance standards under the UK’s insurance industry solvency regulations.
5. Unlike the ‘pure-play’ approach commonly used for cost of equity estimation, which discards conglomerates, the FIB approach
includes conglomerate as well as specialist firms to identify the impact of various lines of business on the cost of capital
(Cummins and Phillips, 2005).
6. The sixmajor lines of insurance business that are used in this study are: personal accident; motor insurance; property insurance;
liability insurance; marine, aviation & transport insurance; and miscellaneous and financial loss. Together, these main lines
comprise over 90% of annual premiums written in the UK insurance market over the period of analysis.
7. The average betas of insurance firms tend to be less than 1.0 - the market mean measure of systematic risk in portfolio theory
(Cummins and Phillips, 2005).
8. Leland (1999) suggests that the degree of risk aversion of a representative investor can be viewed as the ‘market price of risk’,
and can be estimated by dividing the market’s instantaneous excess rate of return by the variance of the market’s instantaneous
rate of return. Accounting for the effects of firm-level human capital and the mean reversion character of stock index, Campbell
(1996) estimates the value of risk aversion parameter ‘b’ to be 3.63. For simplicity, Wen et al., (2008) use the nearest integer
value of 4 in their calculations; we do the same in this study.
9. The insurance underwriting cycle reflects temporal changes in premium rates, profits and capital capacity. The cycle begins
after periods of large across-sector losses when premium rates rise, thereby, increasing profits, and attracting inflows of capital
into the non-life insurance sector. In competitive insurance markets, such as the UK, increased capital capacity deflates prices
thus reducing insurers’ profitability.
10. We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this definition of the Z-score.
11. Another commonly used test for endogeneity is the C-statistic, which is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistic.
Under the assumption of conditional homoskedasticity, this endogeneity test statistic is numerically equal to a Hausman test
statistic (see Hayashi (2000), 233–234). With a test statistic of 2.25 (p-value of 0.13), the computed C-statistic test also accords
with the result of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reported in panel B of Table 3.
Acknowledgements
The comments of Dylan Thomas and Hong Zou are gratefully acknowledged. The paper also benefited from the comments of
participants at seminars hosted by the Intercollegiate Accounting and Finance Colloquium, Gregynog and American Risk and
Insurance Association. In addition, Vineet Upreti and Yihui Jia are grateful for the financial support of theWillis Research Network.
Finally, the usual disclaimer applies.
Disclosure statement




Abdul-Kader, H., M. Adams, and K. Mouratidis. 2010. “Testing for Trade-Offs in the Reinsurance Decision of U.K. Life Insurance
Firms.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 25: 491–522.
Abudy, M., S. Benninga, and E. Shust. 2016. “The Cost of Equity for Private Firms.” Journal of Corporate Finance 37: 431–443.
Altman, E. I. 1968. “Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy.” The Journal of Finance
23: 589–609.
Altman, E. I. 2013. “Predicting Financial Distress of Companies: Revisiting the Z-Score and ZETA® Models.” In Handbook of
Research Methods and Applications in Empirical Finance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Aunon-Nerin, D., and P. Ehling. 2008. “Why Firms Purchase Property Insurance?” Journal of Financial Economics 90: 298–312.
Bartram, S. M., G. W. Brown, and J. Conrad. 2011. “The Effects of Derivatives on Firm Risk and Value.” Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 46: 967–999.
Bartram, S. M., G. W. Brown, and R. M. Stulz. 2012. “Why are U.S. Stocks More Volatile?” The Journal of Finance 67: 1329–1370.
Borde, S. F., K. Chambliss, and J. Madura. 1994. “Explaining Variation in Risk Across Insurance Companies.” Journal of Financial
Services Research 8: 177–191.
Botosan, C. A. 1997. “Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital.” Accounting Review 72: 323–349.
Botosan, C. A., and M. A. Plumlee. 2005. “Assessing Alternative Proxies for the Expected Risk Premium.” The Accounting Review
80: 21–53.
THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE 19
Botosan, C. A., M. A. Plumlee, and H. E. Wen. 2011. “The Relation Between Expected Returns, Realized Returns, and Firm Risk
Characteristics.” Contemporary Accounting Research 28: 1085–1122.
Campbell, J. Y. 1996. “Understanding Risk and Return.” Journal of Political Economy 104: 298–345.
Campbell, J. Y., J. Hilscher, and J. Szilagi. 2008. “In Search of Distress Risk.” The Journal of Finance 63: 2899–2939.
Campello, M., C. Lin, Y. U. E. Ma, and H. Zou. 2011. “The Real and Financial Implications of Corporate Hedging.” The Journal of
Finance 66: 1615–1647.
Chava, S., and R. A. Jarrow. 2004. “Bankruptcy Prediction with Industry Effects∗.” Review of Finance 8: 537–569.
Chava, S., and A. Purnanandam. 2010. “Is Default Risk Negatively Related to Stock Returns?” Review of Financial Studies 23:
2523–2559.
Chen, J., and T. H. D. King. 2014. “Corporate Hedging and the Cost of Debt.” Journal of Corporate Finance 29: 221–245.
Choi, J. J., C. X. Mao, and A. D. Upadhyay. 2013. “Corporate RiskManagement Under Information Asymmetry.” Journal of Business
Finance & Accounting 40: 239–271.
Cole, C. R., and K. A.McCullough. 2006. “A Reexamination of the Corporate Demand for Reinsurance.” Journal of Risk & Insurance
73: 169–192.
Cummins, J. D., and R. D. Phillips. 2005. “Estimating the Cost of Equity Capital for Property-Liability Insurers.” Journal of Risk &
Insurance 72: 441–478.
Cummins, J. D., and R. D. Phillips. 2009. “Capital Adequacy and Insurance Risk-Based Capital Systems.” Journal of Insurance
Regulation 28: 25–72.
DeMarzo, P. M., and D. Duffie. 1995. “Corporate Incentives for Hedging and Hedge Accounting.” Review of Financial Studies 8:
743–771.
Dichev, I. D. 1998. “Is the Risk of Bankruptcy a Systematic Risk?” The Journal of Finance 53: 1131–1147.
Disatnik, D., R. Duchin, and B. Schmidt. 2013. “Cash Flow Hedging and Liquidity Choices.” Review of Finance 18: 715–748.
Doherty, N. A. 2000. Integrated Risk Management: Techniques and Strategies for Reducing Risk. London: McGraw-Hill.
Doherty, N. A., and J. Lamm-Tennant. 2009. “Lessons from the Financial Crisis on Risk and Capital Management: The Case of
Insurance Companies.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 21: 52–59.
Doherty, N. A., and S. M. Tinic. 1981. “Reinsurance Under Conditions of Capital Market Equilibrium: A Note.” Journal of Finance
36: 949–953.
Driscoll, J. C., and A. C. Kraay. 1998. “Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Spatially Dependent Panel Data.” Review of
Economics and Statistics 80: 549–560.
Easley, D., and M. O’Hara. 2004. “Information and the Cost of Capital.” The Journal of Finance 59: 1553–1583.
Fama, E. F., andK. R. French. 1995. “Size and Book-to-Market Factors in Earnings and Returns.”The Journal of Finance 50: 131–155.
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French. 1997. “Industry Costs of Equity.” Journal of Financial Economics 43: 153–193.
Froot, K. A. 1999. The Financing of Catastrophe Risk. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Froot, K. A. 2001. “The Market for Catastrophe Risk: A Clinical Examination.” Journal of Financial Economics 60: 529–571.
Froot, K. A. 2007. “Risk Management, Capital Budgeting, and Capital Structure Policy for Insurers and Reinsurers.” Journal of Risk
& Insurance 74: 273–299.
Froot, K. A., and P. O’Connell. 2008. “On the Pricing of Intermediated Risks: Theory and Application to Catastrophe Reinsurance.”
Journal of Banking & Finance 32: 69–85.
Froot, K. A., D. S. Scharfstein, and J. C. Stein. 1993. “RiskManagement: CoordinatingCorporate Investment and Financing Policies.”
The Journal of Finance 48: 1629–1658.
Garven, J. R., and J. Lamm-Tennant. 2003. “The Demand for Reinsurance: Theory and Empirical Tests.” Insurance & Risk
Management 7: 217–237.
Garven, J. R., and R. D. MacMinn. 1993. “The Underinvestment Problem, Bond Covenants, and Insurance.” The Journal of Risk and
Insurance 60: 635–646.
Gay, G. D., C. Lin, and S. D. Smith. 2011. “Corporate Derivatives Use and the Cost of Equity.” Journal of Banking & Finance 35:
1491–1506.
Gormley, T. A., and D. A. Matsa. 2014. “Common Errors: How to (and not to) Control for Unobserved Heterogeneity.” Review of
Financial Studies 27: 617–661.
Gray, P., P.-S. Koh, and Y. H. Tong. 2009. “Accruals Quality, Information Risk and Cost of Capital: Evidence fromAustralia.” Journal
of Business Finance & Accounting 36: 51–72.
Greene, W. H. 2003. Econometric Analysis. Hoboken, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Gregory, A., and M. Michou. 2009. “Industry Cost of Equity Capital: UK Evidence.” Journal of Business Finance &amp; Accounting
36: 679–704.
Hayashi, F. 2000. Econometrics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hennessy, C. A., and T. M. Whited. 2005. “Debt Dynamics.” The Journal of Finance 60: 1129–1165.
Hoerger, T. J., F. A. Sloan, and M. Hassan. 1990. “Loss Volatility, Bankruptcy, and the Demand for Reinsurance.” Journal of Risk &
Uncertainty 3: 221–245.
Huang,W., Q. Liu, S. G. Rhee, and L. Zhang. 2010. “Return Reversals, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Expected Returns.”Review of Financial
Studies 23: 147–168.
Jean-Baptiste, E. L., and A.M. Santomero. 2000. “The Design of Private Reinsurance Contracts.” Journal of Financial Intermediation
9: 274–297.
20 V. UPRETI ET AL.
Kaplan, P. D., and J. D. Peterson. 1998. “Full-Information Industry Betas.” Financial Management 27: 85–93.
Koller, T., M. H. Goedhart, and D.Wessels. 2010. Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Kyriacou, K., J. B. Madsen, and B. Mase. 2006. “Does Inflation Exaggerate the Equity Premium?” Journal of Economic Studies 33:
344–356.
Larsen, C. R., and R. J. Resutek. 2017. “Types of Investor Uncertainty and the Cost of Equity Capital.” Journal of Business Finance &
Accounting 44: 1169–1193.
Laux, C., and A. Muermann. 2010. “Financing Risk Transfer Under Governance Problems: Mutual Versus Stock Insurers.” Journal
of Financial Intermediation 19: 333–354.
Leland, H. E. 1998. “Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure.” The Journal of Finance 53: 1213–1243.
Leland, H. E. 1999. “Beyond Mean–Variance: Performance Measurement in a Nonsymmetrical World (Corrected).” Financial
Analysts Journal 55: 27–36.
Li, K., J. Lockwood, and H. Miao. 2017. “Risk-Shifting, Equity Risk, and the Distress Puzzle.” Journal of Corporate Finance 44:
275–288.
Lin, C., P. Lin, and H. Zou. 2012. “Does Property Rights Protection Affect Corporate Risk Management Strategy? Intra- and Cross-
Country Evidence.” Journal of Corporate Finance 18: 311–330.
Lloyd’s of London. 2018. Lloyd’s 2017 Annual Report. London: Lloyd’s Insurance Market.
Low, P. 2019. “The Natural Disasters of 2018 in Figures.”Munich Re.
Mayers, D., and C. W. Smith. 1982. “On the Corporate Demand for Insurance.” The Journal of Business 55: 281–296.
Mayers, D., and C.W. Smith. 1990. “On the Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the ReinsuranceMarket.” The Journal
of Business 63: 19–40.
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller. 1963. “Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: a Correction.” The American Economic
Review 53: 433–443.
Nance, D. R., C. W. Smith, and C. W. Smithson. 1993. “On the Determinants of Corporate Hedging.” The Journal of Finance 48:
267–284.
Nelson, K. K. 2000. “Rate Regulation, Competition, and Loss Reserve Discounting by Property-Casualty Insurers.” The Accounting
Review 75: 115–138.
O’Hanlon, J., and A. Steele. 2000. “Estimating Equity Risk Premium Using Accounting Fundamentals.” Journal of Business Finance
& Accounting 27: 1051–1083.
Plantin, G. 2006. “Does Reinsurance Need Reinsurers?” Journal of Risk & Insurance 73: 153–168.
Post, T., H. Gründl, L. Schmidl, and M. S. Dorfman. 2007. “Implications of IFRS for the European Insurance Industry - Insights
from Capital Market Theory.” Risk Management and Insurance Review 10: 247–265.
Rubinstein, M. 1976. “The Valuation of Uncertain Income Streams and the Pricing of Options.” The Bell Journal of Economics 7:
407–425.
Schrand, C., and H. Unal. 1998. “Hedging and Coordinated Risk Management: Evidence from Thrift Conversions.” The Journal of
Finance 53: 979–1013.
Sharfman, M. P., and C. S. Fernando. 2008. “Environmental Risk Management and the Cost of Capital.” Strategic Management
Journal 29: 569–592.
Shim, J. 2011. “Mergers &Acquisitions, Diversification, and Performance in the U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Industry.” Journal
of Financial Services Research 39: 119–144.
Shimpi, P. 2002. “Integrating Risk Management and Capital Management.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 14: 27–40.
Shiu, Y.-M. 2011. “Reinsurance and Capital Structure: Evidence from the United Kingdom Non-Life Insurance Industry.” Journal
of Risk & Insurance 78: 475–494.
Shumway, T. 2001. “Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately:A Simple Hazard Model.” The Journal of Business 74: 101–124.
Smith, C. W., and R. M. Stulz. 1985. “The Determinants of Firms’ Hedging Policies.” Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis
20: 391–405.
Stulz, R. 1996. “Rethinking Risk Management.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9: 8–25.
Swiss Re. 2018. “World Insurance in 2017: Solid But Mature Life Markets Weigh on Growth, Sigma, 3/2018.” Swiss Re, Zurich.
Tufano, P. 1998. “Agency Costs of Corporate Risk Management.” Financial Management 27: 67–77.
Upreti, V., and M. Adams. 2015. “The Strategic Role of Reinsurance in the United Kingdom’s (UK) Non-Life Insurance Market.”
Journal of Banking & Finance 61: 206–219.
Vassalou, M., and Y. Xing. 2004. “Default Risk in Equity Returns.” The Journal of Finance 59: 831–868.
Veprauskaite, E., and M. B. Adams. 2018. “Leverage and Reinsurance Effects on Loss Reserves in the United Kingdom’s Prop-
erty–Casualty Insurance Industry.” Accounting and Business Research 48: 373–399.
Wakker, P., R. Thaler, and A. Tversky. 1997. “Probabilistic Insurance.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 15: 7–28.
Wen, M.-M., A. D. Martin, G. Lai, and T. J. O’Brien. 2008. “Estimating the Cost of Equity for Property-Liability Insurance
Companies.” Journal of Risk &amp; Insurance 75: 101–124.
Wooldridge, J. M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Zou, H., and M. B. Adams. 2008. “Debt Capacity, Cost of Debt and Corporate Insurance.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 43: 433–466.
